Report of Virtue Ethics and Animals Essay

Prompt 1 Rosalind Hursthouse is a renowned virtuous philosopher who champions virtue ethics, peerless of the three major approaches in normative philosophy. In contrast to deontology and consequentialism, virtue ethics is an agent-centered approach that answers the question of what should I be? while does not offer clear rule or ethical answers on why one should/should not recreate. (Guidry-Grimes, 1/31/2013) Virtue ethics empathizes the role of moral vulcanized fiber embodied by the moral agent for assessing his/her ethical behavior and character.In other word, we think what would a virtuous moral agent will act under given circumstance, and he/she typically does what is virtuous and evacuate what is vice. The principles of virtue ethics are the v-rules, namely thinking in terms of virtues and vices, as a virtue person do what is compassionate, do not what is cruel. Applying the v-rules is highly contextual and heavily based on specific circumstances, under which the moral a gent should evaluate what are virtuous to act and subdue actions of vices.Most historicly, in virtue ethics, although virtues and vices are given many vocabulary or ways to describe, there is no rule that specify what the type actions belongs to virtues or vices. For example, compassion can be a virtue or a fault depending on specific scenario (Hurtshouse, 126). Therefore, it is important to recognize that determination of virtuous character and what action would consider virtuous is not always forthright and clear. (Hurtshouse, 127) Having established what virtue ethics is, Hursthouse argues that the concept of moral office is unnecessary and irrelevant for applied virtue ethics.Both deontology and consequentialism, two other branches of normative ethics, are heavily depended upon the moral emplacement concept which fundamentally divides everything into two classes things with moral attitude that are within our circle of concern and worthwhile of moral principles and things without moral 1Page Ye, Kening Prompt 1 experimental condition and are outside of the circle. Hursthouse has pointed out several issues related to the moral position arguments. It is hard to draw a fine line for determining what confine moral spatial relation.Things without moral status can execute of our moral concern if they have sentient value and moral worth to those we concern thus they puzzle valuable to us. If to expand the circle of concern to all sentient animals, it becomes over-simplified and problematic for our moral termination making as beings with moral status can bear competing claims that may require us to further distinguish their features in order to justify our finale making (Hursthouse, 123).In addition, it is criticized as speciesim if to only keep man beings with moral status. Although Hurtshouse compares and contrasts the characteristics of speciesim and familysm, and concludes that giving moral preference for our species, namely military personnel beings, is sometimes wrong but sometimes right (Hursthouse, 122), another issue is that we sometimes cannot avoid to evaluate the significance of moral worth among members of moral status. In short, the common consensus is that all humans are within the circle of concern.The moral status arguments not only give human being strong preference over nonhuman beings but also have instilled priority in decision making for moral agents. As Hursthouse argue, attaching the concept of moral status does not contribute to virtue ethics but only adds complications. If to apply the moral status conception into animal ethics, we are directed to act divisively upon two different groups, namely humans and nonhuman animals, in terms of our sermon and attitude.As such, our manipulation and attitude toward the groups are often distinguished since preference is always given to human beings under universal circumstance. However, on the other hand, virtue ethics challenges us, as moral agents, to strive for virtues and deliver actions that are deemed virtuous in nature. This approach is heavily 2Page Ye, Kening Prompt 1 Prompt 1 status and are outside of the circle. Hursthouse has pointed out several issues related to the moral status arguments.It is hard to draw a fine line for determining what deem moral status. Things without moral status can become of our moral concern if they have sentient value and moral worth to those we concern thus they become valuable to us. If to expand the circle of concern to all sentient animals, it becomes over-simplified and problematic for our moral decision making as beings with moral status can fuddle competing claims that may require us to further distinguish their features in order to justify our decision making (Hursthouse, 123).In addition, it is criticized as speciesim if to only keep human beings with moral status. Although Hurtshouse compares and contrasts the characteristics of speciesim and familysm, and concludes that giving moral pre ference for our species, namely human beings, is sometimes wrong but sometimes right (Hursthouse, 122), another issue is that we sometimes cannot avoid to evaluate the significance of moral worth among members of moral status. In short, the common consensus is that all humans are within the circle of concern.The moral status arguments not only give human being strong preference over nonhuman beings but also have instilled priority in decision making for moral agents. As Hursthouse argue, attaching the concept of moral status does not contribute to virtue ethics but only adds complications. If to apply the moral status conception into animal ethics, we are directed to act divisively upon two different groups, namely humans and nonhuman animals, in terms of our treatment and attitude.As such, our treatment and attitude toward the groups are often distinguished since preference is always given to human beings under universal circumstance. However, on the other hand, virtue ethics chall enges us, as moral agents, to strive for virtues and deliver actions that are deemed virtuous in nature. This approach is heavily 2Page Ye, Kening Prompt 1.